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Abstract
Despite the clear fitness consequences of animal decisions, the science of animal 
decision making in evolutionary biology is underdeveloped compared to decision 
science in human psychology. Specifically, the field lacks a conceptual framework that 
defines and describes the relevant components of a decision, leading to imprecise 
language and concepts. The “judgment and decision making” (JDM) framework in 
human psychology is powerful for framing and understanding human decisions, and we 
apply it here to components of animal decisions, which we refer to as “cognitive 
phenotypes.” We distinguish multiple cognitive phenotypes in the context of a JDM 
framework and highlight empirical approaches to characterize them as evolvable traits. 
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2Opening the Black Box of Animal Decision Making
The fitness consequences of animal decisions, from mating to feeding to finding 
shelter, are relatively easy to characterize compared to the cognitive processes that 
drive them. As for any complex trait, decisions emerge from the interaction of multiple 
components. We consider each of these components to be a unique cognitive 
phenotype (Figure 1, Glossary). By adopting this nomenclature, we mean to 
emphasize that any component of the decision making process can vary among 
individuals, have genetic and environmental components of variation, and be subject to 
selection. Characterizing the cognitive phenotypes that underlie animal decisions is 
essential for understanding how decision making evolves. 
For decades, researchers have struggled to describe the internal (cognitive) 
components of animal decisions. In the early 20th century, behaviorists like B.F. Skinner 
approached cognition as a black box, insisting that internal processes can never be 
inferred from observations of behavior [1]. Modern ethologists and behavioral 
ecologists, however, have made a strong case for inferring cognition from carefully 
designed behavioral experiments [2-5]. Moreover, as advancing technology reveals the 
neural architecture of cognition with unprecedented precision [6-9], we are poised to 
make substantive links between animal decisions in the wild, the cognitive phenotypes 
that produce those decisions, and the fitness consequences that shape them [10,11]. 
In spite of this progress, behavioral ecology lacks a cohesive framework for 
understanding the decision-making process [12,13], often leading to imprecise language
and concepts when describing animal decisions in natural systems. Researchers often 
use the same term to refer to different cognitive phenotypes. For example, 
"discrimination" might be used to refer to an animal's perceptual ability to distinguish two
similar stimuli, or it might refer to the tendency to mate with conspecifics over 
heterospecifics; yet, the two situations involve different cognitive and physiological 
processes, e.g. [7]. The absence of a cohesive decision framework is also problematic 
when behaviors are used to infer particular cognitive phenotypes, because different 
cognitive processes can lead to the same behavioral output [1,12,14]. For example, a 
female might mate with a heterospecific because of any number of internal processes, 
including an inability to perceive a difference between conspecifics and heterospecifics 
or the absence of a preference (see below). 
We propose that problems linking behavioral and cognitive phenotypes can be 
mitigated by adopting the robust conceptual framework that guides research in human 
decision making. This framework distinguishes two main categories of cognitive 
phenotypes: “judgments” and “decisions”. Judgments refer to how individuals acquire 
and process information to arrive at an understanding of the situation or state of the 
world. Decisions refer to the processes by which individuals use judgments to arrive at a
course of action [15]. In other words, individuals can vary in two main ways: how they 
"see" the world, and what they decide to do about it. This distinction forms the 
foundation of human decision-making science and frames a highly productive research 
agenda in human psychology [12-16].
Here, we integrate this judgment and decision-making framework (JDM) into 
behavioral ecology, assigning cognitive phenotypes like discrimination, recognition, 
preference, and choice to one of these two categories (Figure 1). This framework is a 
novel way for behavioral ecologists to consider animal decisions and brings multiple 
3Figure 1. Cognitive Phenotypes Underlying Animal Decisions. Animal behavior is initiated by information 
and culminates in action. The two center boxes represent the decision-making component of the process,
which is modeled in psychology as a combination of judgments and decisions. Terms commonly used in 
behavioral ecology are mapped onto this framework and represent cognitive phenotypes that might vary 
among individuals and affect relative fitness. Feedback is assumed within and between all components, 
and components and their interactions can be affected by context, that is, the dynamic social and 
ecological environment in which a cognitive phenotype is expressed.
advantages. First, it specifies two broad classes of processes with fundamentally 
different functions that can be modeled distinctly, e.g., Bayesian inference for judgments
versus utility maximization for decisions (see below). Second, this framework 
emphasizes the cognitive process over the behavioral end product. These cognitive 
phenotypes represent the relevant axes of variation, continuous or categorical, along 
which individuals can differ and upon which selection can act. Linking this variation with 
variation in fitness serves a fundamental goal of behavioral ecology [17-19]. Third, 
identifying discrete cognitive phenotypes and anchoring them to a JDM framework 
clarifies their role in the decision-making process, which in turn allows us to identify and 
compare homologous processes across taxa [20] and determine which experimental 
approaches reveal the phenotype of interest (Box 1, Box 2). Finally, the study of 
decision making is a multi-disciplinary science. Integrating the JDM framework into 
behavioral ecology facilitates a shared understanding of concepts and techniques 
across the fields of human and nonhuman decision making, advancing our 
understanding of decision making across disciplines.
We begin by describing judgment and decision making as implemented in the 
field of human psychology and discuss cases where it has been implicitly applied in 
behavioral ecology. We then identify concepts that form the core of a shared ontology, 
that is, a formal specification of the concepts or entities that define an intellectual 
discipline and the relationships among them [21]. This ontology provides more than a 
shared lexicon; it generates fundamental conceptual distinctions and can elucidate 
relationships among cognitive processes that are frequently conflated in the literature. 
We explore common usage of these terms within behavioral ecology, provide 
descriptions consistent with a JDM framework, and offer alternative experimental 
approaches that could help identify each phenotype (Box 1), highlighting empirical 
examples (Box 2). Our goal is to advance a framework that facilitates an evolutionary 
perspective on animal decisions. A JDM view of decision making enables researchers to
characterize relevant cognitive phenotypes, quantify variation in those phenotypes 
among individuals, and link fitness outcomes to that variation. 
4Box 1: Experimental approaches
Behavioral ecologists typically study decision making using choice tests, in which they 
present options to an individual who indicates choice with an action, such as moving toward an 
option or pulling a lever [49]. However, that action can result from multiple judgments and 
decisions, and a choice test cannot always distinguish among the various cognitive phenotypes 
that might underlie the action. If an individual fails to choose one option over another, it is 
unclear whether the individual failed to make the judgment, e.g. failed to discriminate, or 
decided not to act, e.g. lacked a preference for one stimulus over the other. 
Therefore, additional information that complements a behavioral choice test is 
sometimes needed to specify the cognitive phenotypes underlying animal decisions. In 
particular, neural responses (e.g., electrophysiological recordings, magnetic resonance 
imaging), physiological responses (e.g., breathing rate, heart rate, hormone levels), or 
behavioral responses other than choice (e.g., eye gaze, habituation-dishabituation) can be used
to test for and characterize any of the cognitive phenotypes (Table I).
 Discrimination can be revealed by presenting two stimuli simultaneously or sequentially 
and measuring neural, physiological, or behavioral responses. Different responses 
across stimulus types demonstrate discrimination.
 To demonstrate recognition, neural, physiological, or behavioral variables should 
respond predictably to stimuli that have been previously experienced and differently to 
stimuli that have not been experienced. Recognition tests are distinguished from simple 
discrimination tests by determining if subjects distinguish between familiar (remembered)
and novel stimuli.
 For categorization, measured variables should respond both similarly to multiple 
exemplars of a given set of stimuli and differently to multiple exemplars not in the set. 
 Demonstrating assessment requires comparing the responses of measured variables 
with features that are known to indicate the quantity or quality of a stimulus (e.g., 
ornaments, odors) to determine whether and how individuals attend to those features.
 Preference can be revealed by activity that exhibits a ranked response to varying stimuli.
• Choice tests easily demonstrate choices by requiring an individual to choose between 
two or more simultaneously presented options. The neural and physiological correlates 
of that choice can be identified in a successful choice test and then measured in a 
subsequent test to demonstrate choice even if action is impeded. 
Table I. Experimental approaches to identifying cognitive phenotypesa
Response
variable
Techniques Cognitive phenotype
Neural Circuit visualization—in vivo imaging of active 
neural circuits
Electrophysiology—measures firing patterns of 
individual neurons 
Magnetic resonance imaging—measures blood 
flow and neural activation of brain regions
Discrimination [7]
Preference [8]
Choice [50]
Physiological Breathing rate—measures the rate of respiration
Heart rate—measures the rate of heart activity
Hormone level—measures levels of hormones in 
blood, feces, saliva, or other bodily fluids
Discrimination [51]
Discrimination [52]
Preference [53]
Behavioral Eye gaze—measures the direction and duration 
of eye gaze
Assessment [54]
5Habitation-dishabituation—measures when 
individuals can detect a difference between 
stimuli to which they have vs. have not been 
repeatedly exposed.
“Choice” test—measures response to options 
using behavioral variables other than direct 
selection of options or association time, e.g., type
of display, intensity of activity
Categorization [55]
Discrimination, Categorization 
[56]
a A host of techniques that measure neural, physiological, and behavioral responses can 
complement a behavioral choice test to pinpoint which components of the decision-making 
process contribute to a given behavioral outcome. Examples of cognitive phenotypes identified 
in the literature are provided in the third column, with references.
The Judgment-Decision Making Dichotomy 
Since the 1940s, the field of judgment and decision making has emerged from 
the integration of cognitive psychology, social psychology, and economics to focus on 
two areas.  One area applies principles of psychophysics and mathematical psychology 
to investigate how humans make judgments about the state of the world; the other 
draws from economics to explore how humans make decisions [15]. Though these 
areas developed through different approaches and questions, they represent an 
important conceptual distinction between making inferences and making choices [12].
Judgments refer to how individuals assess information to arrive at an 
understanding of their world [15]. All organisms use various imperfect information 
(sensation, memory, etc.) to make a judgment or inference about the true state of the 
world or to predict future states of the world. The primary measure of judgments is 
accuracy—that is, the correspondence between the perceived and true state of the 
world. Often Bayes’ rule is used to assess accuracy, by determining whether an 
individual is accurately updating its belief about the state of the world given new 
information [22]. 
In contrast, decisions refer to how individuals determine a course of action or 
choose among different options [15]. Whereas judgments are typically modeled in a 
Bayesian framework, much of the study of decisions has come from economics and 
utility theory—to continue performing well in the market, an individual should choose 
options that offer the highest utility [23]. There is no measure of accuracy for decisions 
because they do not directly refer to the state of the world.  The question of what is a 
good decision depends upon how well that decision coheres to some criterion.  In 
economics, that criterion is expected utility maximization; in evolutionary biology, it is 
fitness maximization.   
Though conceptually and empirically separable, judgments and decisions are 
nonetheless inextricably linked.  Judgments are rarely made without a subsequent 
selection among options; decisions often require some evaluation of the state of the 
world; and the processes can feed back on one another [12].  For example, when a 
female spider encounters a male conspecific, she may categorize him as a potential 
mate (judgment #1) and simultaneously or sequentially assess his quality (judgment 
#2). Depending on these judgments, she may allow him to approach (decision #1) and 
6Box 2. Empirical Examples of Cognitive Phenotypes
Behavior Demonstrates Discrimination and Categorization without Preference in 
Sticklebacks
Kozak et al. [55] showed that male sticklebacks (Figure IA) court conspecific and heterospecific 
females with equivalent intensity; however, they vary the type of courtship display depending on 
the species, using behavior that is typical of the species being courted. This indicates an ability 
to discriminate the two species without a preference for one over the other. This experiment also
demonstrated categorization; males exhibited the same display to multiple individuals of one set
and a different display to multiple individuals of another set.
Neuronal Spike Rates Demonstrate Categorization in Zebra Finches
Hauber et al. [9] measured the spike rates of single neurons in the auditory forebrain of female 
zebra finches (Figure IB) in response to male songs. Higher spike rates were recorded in 
response to conspecific songs compared with songs of two heterospecifics; each stimulus 
category was represented by multiple individual exemplars. However, spike rates in response to
the two heterospecifics did not differ, suggesting the categorization of conspecific song.
Eye Tracking Demonstrates Assessment In Peahens
Female peahens (Figure IC) have been shown to choose males based on the number of 
eyespots in their train and the length of their long ‘fishtail’ feather. Yorzinski et al. [53] outfitted 
peahens with an eye-tracking device to monitor which features of a male were attended to by 
females during mate choice. Females paid most attention to the eyespots on the lower 
segments of the train as well as the fishtail, thus empirically supporting and quantifying 
assessment of these features.
Neuronal Spike Rates Demonstrate Preference in Gryllus bimaculatus 
Kastarakos and Hedwig [8] showed that the strength of the phonotactic response of female 
Gryllus bimaculatus crickets to variation in male chirp pulse duration varies continuously (Figure
ID). When exposed to the same set of stimuli, activity patterns of one neuron matched the 
graded female phonotaxis behavior, demonstrating a cognitively encoded ranking of options 
(preference) that corresponded to female decisions.
Figure I. (A) Threespine stickleback Gasterosteus aculeatus (credit Piet Spaans), (B) Zebra finch 
Taeniopygia guttata (credit Keith Gerstung), (C) Indian peafowl Pavo cristatus (credit Jessica Yorzinksi), 
(D) Two-spotted cricket Gryllus bimaculatus (credit Gerd Rossen/www.digital-nature-photography.com).
7then mate with him (decision #2). Early decisions can modify subsequent judgments, 
which in turn can modify subsequent decisions. If she decides to eat the male instead of
mating with him, for example, assessment may focus on nutritional quality. Thus, as for 
any decision, copulation requires both judgments and decisions that can act 
sequentially, simultaneously, and iteratively.  
We are not the first to apply this kind of framework to behavioral ecology. 
Blumstein & Bouskila [14] present an "assessment" and decision-making framework, 
where assessment is essentially equivalent to psychology's judgment. They point out 
that cognitive processes are difficult to glean from behavior alone, and that knowledge 
of "informational states" (judgments) is critical (see Figure 1 in [14]). We extend the 
ideas of Blumstein & Bouskila [14], but rather than inventing a new framework and 
associated terminology, we suggest that JDM, as a productive psychological framework 
already in place, can serve to clarify thinking in behavioral ecology and help identify the 
proximate bases and ultimate consequences of animal decisions. 
Developing a Decision-making Ontology
Blumstein & Bouskila [14] demonstrate that behavioral ecologists might already 
implicitly distinguish between judgments and decisions. Nonetheless, many terms that 
describe the components of animal decisions are used inconsistently, interchangeably, 
and without a guiding framework in which to organize and distinguish them.  To clarify 
terms in a way that is useful for behavioral researchers, we explored the use of six 
common and often interchangeably used terms from behavioral ecology: assessment, 
categorization, discrimination, recognition, preference, and choice. We conducted a 
targeted literature search to examine how these terms were defined or used in three 
well-studied behavioral domains: mating, foraging, and habitat selection. For each term,
we searched in Web of Science (http://wokinfo.com/) using the stem of the term (e.g. 
“recogn*”, “choice”), other terms that specified one of the three behavioral domains 
(e.g., “forag*”, “mate”, “habitat”), and the term “definition” or “defined”. For each term, 
we identified a minimum of two articles per behavioral domain with clearly labeled 
definitions, as well as multiple additional articles from which definitions could be gleaned
from usage. Based on this qualitative analysis, we summarize usages across domains 
for each term and offer new or modified descriptions of each term that distinguish them 
one from another within the JDM framework.
Judgment The concept of judgment is not widely applied in behavioral ecology. We 
advocate a description consistent with the psychological literature, as making an 
inference or drawing a conclusion about the state of the world based on information 
from the internal and external environment. Four processes associated with judgments
—discrimination, categorization, assessment, and recognition—are commonly used in 
behavioral ecology.
Discrimination is arguably the most basic cognitive process involved in a judgment. 
Environments (stimuli) vary along multiple dimensions, and distinguishing natural 
variants can be critical to an individual's fitness. The concept of discrimination is used 
broadly in all three domains of behavioral ecology examined here. In some cases, it is 
defined as a cognitive process preceding action [24], but is more commonly defined as 
8an action, when animals behave differently toward one stimulus versus another [25-27]. 
We consider discrimination, rather than an action, to be the cognitive process of 
distinguishing two or more distinct stimuli. 
Categorization is another process used to infer the state of the world and is predicated 
on discrimination. Categorization is used often in the mating and foraging domains of 
behavioral ecology but rarely in the context of habitat selection. Unlike discrimination, 
categorization is most commonly described as a cognitive process [28,29], though 
actions can be used to identify it. We describe categorization as assigning two or more 
similar stimuli to a set and distinguishing between stimuli in different sets. 
Demonstrating categorization therefore requires multiple test stimuli that either do or do 
not belong to a set of interest.
Assessment is used across the three examined domains of behavioral ecology. Most 
commonly, assessment describes the acquisition of information related to the quantity 
or quality of a given stimulus, implicitly or explicitly referring to the fitness consequences
of that stimulus [30,31]. Unlike discrimination or categorization, the concept of 
assessment applies to a single stimulus rather than two or more and is best described 
as extracting a measurable value of a stimulus that indicates quality or quantity.
Recognition is frequently used in the mating domain of behavioral ecology but less so 
in foraging or habitat selection. In the mating literature, recognition describes a 
response to any member of a certain category, as in "mate recognition" or "kin 
recognition" e.g., [32,33]. By contrast, in psychology, the concept of recognition 
generally emphasizes a role of memory [34,35]. To "re-cognize" a stimulus is to 
experience and process it again, meaning the stimulus has been previously processed. 
Recognition is therefore responding predictably to a previously experienced and 
remembered stimulus. A good example of recognition is individual recognition in paper 
wasps, in which individuals are remembered based on facial patterns [36]; however, 
many cases of mate recognition [37], competitor recognition [38], kin recognition, 
predator recognition, and species recognition, in which animals respond to sets of 
individuals rather than remembered stimuli, are better described as categorization than 
recognition. Framing these phenomena as categorization allows us to apply existing 
theories in psychology to behavioral ecology (e.g., exemplar vs. prototype theories of 
categorization [39]) to better understand how these judgments are made. 
Decision is an umbrella term that refers to the cognitive processes that evaluate and 
select options to arrive at a course of action. A decision itself is not an overt action or 
behavior; individuals may decide before acting. Yet, because decisions are further 
"downstream" in the decision-making process (Figure 1), behavioral tests may provide 
more direct measures of decisions than of judgments.
Preference is used in all three behavioral ecology domains examined and typically is 
described as the act of selecting one or some options over others e.g., [25,40,41]. 
Certainly behavioral experiments can identify preferences, but we distinguish an internal
process of preference from its behavioral outcome. For example, neurons in the anterior
9protocerebrum of female crickets Gryllus bimaculatus fire at different rates depending 
on the pulse duration of male calls, with some durations producing higher firing rates 
than others [8, Box 2]. This neural “ranking” of stimuli therefore is represented internally 
and independently of its behavioral outcome. We describe preference as the cognitive 
encoding of a ranking of options. 
Choice is used ubiquitously in behavioral ecology. Perhaps more than any other 
component of a decision-making process, choice is defined as an action, e.g., a 
behavior that restricts the potential set of mates [42], a specific type of foraging behavior
that is driven by preference [43], or the probability of settling in a particular habitat [44]. 
However, though these actions result from a choice, an organism arrives at that choice 
prior to the motor activity typically measured in an experiment. For example, an 
individual may choose a mate but be prevented from mating due to the presence of a 
predator. Therefore, we describe choice as the cognitive process of selecting an action 
in the face of alternatives. 
Though no one example can illustrate all of these cognitive phenotypes perfectly,
imagine the following case. A sample of female crickets faces a choice between a 
conspecific and heterospecific call in a phonotaxis trial (Figure 2), and their behavior 
varies. Some females approach the conspecific call; others spend an equal amount of 
time with each call type. Multiple hypotheses, targeting different cognitive phenotypes, 
could explain the difference in behavior, and Box 1 offers guidance on testing each of 
these hypotheses. 
 Some females are able to discriminate between the two call types (i.e., perceive 
them as different), whereas other females cannot. 
 Some females recognize one call type from prior experience and others fail to 
remember it. 
 Some females categorize conspecific and heterospecific calls into different sets, 
whereas others categorize them together. 
 Some females are able to assess the relevant features of the calls (e.g., pulse 
rate), whereas others cannot detect these features. 
These four hypotheses explain behavioral variation as a result of differences in 
judgment; however, females also can differ in decision phenotypes. 
 Some females have a preference for trait values that correspond with conspecific
calls, whereas others rank conspecific and heterospecific calls equally. 
 All females prefer conspecific calls, but some are motivated to make a choice 
while others are not, perhaps because they recently mated. 
Clarifying the concepts that we use to describe and quantify animal decisions 
thus facilitates discussion and hypothesis testing within and across disciplines. 
Behavioral ecologists might already implicitly acknowledge the broader distinction of the
JDM framework; however, by explicitly speaking a common language based on this 
framework, behavioral ecologists can leverage existing models (e.g., Bayesian 
inference, optimality) and experimental designs (e.g., habituation-dishabituation, eye 
tracking) from psychology to define and characterize cognitive phenotypes, test 
hypotheses about behavioral variation, and predict evolutionary outcomes in natural 
systems. 
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Figure 2. A Typical Phonotaxis Trial Offering A Female Cricket A Choice between Two Song Types.
Conclusions and Future Directions 
With carefully designed studies that distinguish cognitive phenotypes, we can 
identify the genetic and neurophysiological bases of individual variation and achieve the
central aim of behavioral ecology: linking the causes of animal decisions with their 
fitness consequences. However, whereas the fitness consequences of a decision may 
be relatively straightforward, its causes have been concealed inside the black box that 
connects information with action. The JDM framework begins to open that black box 
and provides an ontology of cognitive phenotypes that researchers can use to identify 
homologous phenotypes and characterize individual variation. As implemented in 
human psychology, however, the JDM framework lacks an explicit evolutionary context. 
Behavioral ecology provides this evolutionary perspective and can offer predictions 
about which judgments are likely to be subject to selection (i.e., those that affect 
fitness), and therefore for which we expect to observe accurate judgments [8]. 
Behavioral ecology also offers a clear currency of maximization for decisions, i.e., 
relative fitness [45]. 
The core list of cognitive phenotypes discussed here presents behavioral 
ecologists with multiple research directions (Box 3). As researchers with access to the 
broadest range of animal systems and decision-making contexts, behavioral ecologists 
are well positioned to identify the neural, physiological, and genetic bases of cognitive 
phenotypes, thus advancing our understanding of how animal decisions are generated 
and how decision making evolves. 
Outstanding Questions
 How do cognitive phenotypes vary among individuals, genotypes, environments, 
etc.?
 How does each cognitive phenotype influence and co-vary with others?
 What are the proximate bases of cognitive phenotypes (i.e., mapping genotype to
phenotype)?
 To what extent does variation in cognitive phenotypes influence fitness?
 What additional cognitive phenotypes contribute to animal decisions?
11
Glossary
Assessment: extracting a measurable value of a stimulus that indicates quality or 
quantity.
Bayes’ Rule: an algorithm for rationally updating a prior belief about the state of the 
world given new evidence.
Categorization: assigning two or more similar stimuli to a set and distinguishing 
between stimuli in different sets.
Choice: the cognitive process of selecting an action in the face of alternatives.
Cognition: the mechanisms by which animals acquire, process, store, and act on 
information [46].
Cognitive phenotype: a discrete cognitive feature that can be quantitatively measured 
and specified in terms of its neurobiology, physiology, or behavior (adapted from [47]).
Decision: an umbrella term that refers to the cognitive processes that evaluate and 
select options to arrive at a course of action.
Discrimination: distinguishing two or more distinct stimuli.
Judgment: making an inference or drawing a conclusion about the state of the world 
based on information from the internal and external environment.
Ontology: a formal specification of the concepts or entities, and the relations among 
those entities, comprising a particular domain of discourse.
Preference: the cognitive encoding of a ranking of options.
Recognition: responding predictably to a previously experienced and remembered 
stimulus.
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